From Khilafat to subjection to European Imperialism and then to emergence of Nation States:
an anthropological exploration of the current condition of Dar ul-Islam

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> Postcolonial nationalist elites maintained the structures of power they had inherited from the colonial experience, and as a rule after gaining so-called independence for their countries, they often aggressively pursued the very same colonial policies they had fiercely fought against during the colonial period. They inherited from Europe a readymade nation-state (with its constitutive power structures) for which the existing social formations had not been adequately prepared.
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> The paradigmatic concept of the citizen, without which no state can last, has been slow in coming, and the political lacunae left after the collapse of the traditional structures have not been properly filled. The nation-state thus sits uncomfortably in the Muslim world … the political organization they adopted from and after colonialism has been and remains authoritarian and oppressive. Their integration of Shari'a as a mode of governance pays nothing more than lip service to the original. The 'Shari'a' practices of modern states in Islamic countries cannot – and must not – be invoked as a measure by which pre-modern paradigmatic Shari'a is understood, evaluated, or judged.
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> The political, legal, and cultural struggles of today's Muslims stem from dissonance between their moral and cultural aspirations, on the one hand, and the moral realities of a modern world, on the other – realities with which they must live, but were not of their own making.
> (Hallaq 2013: 2-3)

In seeking to make sense of the contemporary international order, which is currently made up of close to two hundred autonomous nation states – together with several more which are in a state of collapse – my immediate instinct as an anthropologist is to ask just how this structure came into being. Viewed from the *longue durée* – an essential prerequisite in this context – it is vital to remember that current international order is manifestly a post-colonial phenomenon. As such it only gained its current shape with the creation of the United Nations in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Since then, however, it membership has grown exponentially, largely as a result of the success collapse of the European Empires whose colonial possessions and protectorates which had hitherto straddled the globe in the latter part of the twentieth century.

1   States and governance in the contemporary post-colonial order

As a result whilst all the Imperial powers shrunk back to become nation states, the global order was suddenly repopulated with a large number overseas colonial jurisdictions which the Imperial powers had brought into being in the previous century, all which suddenly emerged as free-standing sovereign states as the Imperial tide retreated. However the boundaries of these new-found jurisdictions were almost always intrinsically arbitrary in character (except in the case of small islands) since the boundaries of the new states were invariably drawn to suit the colonists' own purposes, with no significant reference to the indigenous socio-political structures over which they established their colonial hegemony. However as the tide went out the colonial order, members of the indigenous elite who went on to establish post-colonial regimes invariably retained the administrative structures which they had inherited from their predecessors, and having represented themselves as founders as a newly minted nation-state, added one further dimension of European governance which their former hegemons had largely denied them: an elected national assembly.

Nevertheless the establishment of effective governance of these new-found nation-states have almost everywhere proved to be intensely problematic, for three main reasons. First of all, the premises around which European conventions governance were constructed, and which their new rules continued to deploy, had for the most part only established shallowest of roots amongst the indigenous population at large: hence a large part of the population continued order their personal lives according to the ancestral, and hence precolonial conventions. Secondly, and almost as importantly, those conventions were often diverse, since colonial boundaries were rarely congruent with ethnic and religious disjunctions. Thirdly, and more disastrously still, members of the new elite tended to clutch desperately to the privileges of modernity. Hence they not only expected to be able to step into the material shoes of the colonial predecessors: they also took over their predecessors' view that their bulk of the indigenous population were illiterate, backward and superstitious, and that more adequate governance would only be available to 'the masses' if they put their outmoded and uncivilised premises behind them in favour of those which underpinned 'modern world'.

However the transition to 'modernity' in this sense has not gone smoothly. In the first place members of the newly established often acted as *nomenclatura,* and as such they not only awarded themselves all sorts of privileges, as well as becoming more and more dictatorial as

they set about securing their position of advantage – and so causing an ever granted degree of resentment amongst the 'illiterate masses'; secondly, and just as alarmingly, they found themselves non-plussed as to how respond to patterns ethno-religious diversity which their predecessors had over-ridden, and which they in turn sought to over-ride by inventing a vision of national homogeneity, in compliance with the assumption that the post-colonial order was not just a state, but a *nation* state. The consequences of all this are now plain to see. Most of the post-colonial states which have recently come into existence in the global South, as well as after the collapse of the Soviet Union, have found themselves in the midst of rocky rides as a result of various combinations of these developments. Most of the dictatorships which emerged in immediate post-colonial era may by now have been overthrown – although leading to civil dictatorship being replaced by a military alternative; secondly internal ethno-religious disjunctions have all too often spiralled in to processes of ethnic cleansing, leading either to the partition of state into two (or more) separate entities of the same kinds, or worse still the collapse of the whole edifice into what had now come to be described as a failed state.

Yet despite the steadily greater salience contradictions of this kind – whose prime source can invariably be traced back to unresolved ethno-religious disjunctions of one kind or another – both the frequency and severity of the tectonic shocks currently being precipitated by these confrontations are becoming a steadily more salient feature in the contemporary global order, especially, but by no means exclusively, in the new jurisdictions which emerged in the post-colonial period. From an International Relations perspective these post-colonial developments can only be regarded as unexpected. From a historical perspective, the assumption that equitable governance could best be achieved within homogeneous nation states, which in turn gave rise to the view that interactions between these entities would henceforth take the shape of inter-*national* relations, can be traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia. Moreover the conceptual roots of this explicitly European vision of 'the nation' was radically reinforced as a result revolutionary developments in both France and the United States in the closing stages of the eighteenth century, during the course of which the premises embedded in the European enlightenment led to the assertion that the most natural, and above all the most equitable foundation of governance in any local political jurisdiction could best be achieved if each such entity was rationally re-constructed as a homogeneous nation state.

This vision proved to be infective. However it was not just that the European powers all began to reconstruct their own systems of governance on what they came to regard as a more rational basis. This vision of better governance came into fashion just as their overseas Empires had begun to go global in extent, with the result that they all began to look to the administrative (but not the democratic) dimensions of European enlightenment as they set about constructing 'modern' and 'progressive' forms of governance in the multiplicity of jurisdictions of which their rapidly expanding overseas jurisdictions had by now began to include. It followed that as a result of this hitherto unprecedented form of administrative globalisation, articulated on the back of the European conceptual vision of enlightenment, together with Euro-America's rapid achievement of global hegemony, began to crystallise as the only viable foundation of contemporary governance, as well as the global standard for the articulation of International Relations.

All this was further reinforced by efforts to establish the League of Nations in the interval between the two World Wars, and subsequently the rather more successful creation of the United Nations in the aftermath of the episode, an institution which is still with us to this day. As this occurred a virtually universal post-colonial consensus emerged in the field of International Relations: namely that only viable – and indeed the only legitimate – basis on which states could be admitted to the fold was if the structure and mode of governance of the body in question was congruent with a basic but universally applicable template, the essential elements of which require that the entity in question should have sovereign control over clearly bounded territory, within which governance is grounded in, and maintained by, regularly elected and re-elected legislative assemblies, and whose members are chosen by universal suffrage in elections in which all the adults resident within the national jurisdiction have an opportunity vote. Entities which lack these any one of the prerequisites – which are very loosely drawn – are denied entry to the international club; meanwhile any jurisdictions whose governance had once been congruent with this template, but had subsequently fallen apart is likely to be identified as unrecognised 'failed states'. In the contemporary world an alarming number post-colonial jurisdiction are currently moving in that direction.

2   The distinctive premises and practices of European Empires

Although the condition period of global hegemony which the Europeans enjoyed during the course of the nineteenth and twentieth century was unprecedentedly extensive, it did not last for long. Nor were they in any way the inventors of Imperial structures – in which a wide

range of local political jurisdictions was subject to the governance of a singular administrative authority. For several millennia such Imperial structures have regularly come and gone emerged in the river valleys of China, of South East Asia, of South Asia, of Central Asia, of Mesopotamia, of Egypt and the shores of Mediterranean, all of which remain potential political power-houses. Moreover whilst most of these structures were both extensive and long lasting – and most especially so in the case of those which emerged under the umbrella of Dar ul-Islam – none attained the global reach of achieved by the seaborne empires emanating from the shores of the North Atlantic, all of which reached their apogees during the nineteenth century before falling away in the twentieth.

Nevertheless there much that was distinctive about these overseas European empires. Although trade the primary force behind their development was the profits which could be made from long-distance trade, after Magellan circumnavigated the globe eager traders in Lisbon, London and Amsterdam soon discovered that they had relatively little to sell in exchange for in exchange for the oriental spices, let alone for manufactured goods such as silk and cotton textiles, as well as Chinese porcelain, for which huge demand subsequently developed across the length and breadth of Western Europe. Hence in the absence of their access to cheap bullion mined by both indigenous and African slaves in Peru and Mexico, for the first two centuries of expansion they acted as middlemen, since they had access to a constant stream of American bullion to purchase otherwise inaccessible goods which were available in the many seaports of the vast area between on the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn. Secondly they were in position to reinforce their trading activities with brute force, since the ships built to survive Atlantic storms could readily be equipped with canon, a practice unknown amongst (largely Muslim) traders operating in the oceans between East Africa and Japan. Thirdly, and even more significantly, whenever they had the power to do so, they routinely legitimised their rapacious initiatives activities on an evangelical basis, on the grounds that they were engaged in bringing the light of the words of Jesus Christ to ignorant heathens in distant lands.

All this had distinctive consequences. Since sea-borne empires articulated on a global basis had direct terrestrial connections with their overseas colonies, the capital cities from which they were governed were not located in the heart of a consolidated area of Imperial territory, as had hitherto been the case; but rather they were many thousands of miles away in Western

Europe. Moreover because these European enterprises were in at least in principle evangelical in character, for the most part made little or no effort to indigenise themselves in their new-found possessions, let alone to familiarise themselves with the religious and cultural practices of the ever expanding indigenous populations over which they had gained sovereignty. After all there was no need to take much cognisance of the indigenes backward, ignorant and superstitious premises, their own vision of civilisation was *ipso facto* infinitely superior to that of 'the natives'.. Hence no matter how extensive these empires became, their home base – no less in terms of language, culture, religion than modes of law and governance – remained firmly located back in Western Europe.

3   Territorially grounded Empires

The territories in which Europe's seaborne adventurers eventual established the colonies which were in due course to provide the foundation of extensive Empires were in no sense in a condition of *tabula rasa* in terms of either political organisation or of governance. To be sure just the particular forms these phenomena took varied enormously, since the ranged all the way from acephalous tribal networks to more or less extensive Kingdom and Emirates, right through to far-flung Empires; and whilst they all managed to maintain a substantial degree of law and order within their respective jurisdictions, none of them were nation states in the contemporary sense, on the obvious grounds that had yet to encounter the premises of the European enlightenment.

Whilst the three potential categories of political jurisdiction which I have identified above are simplistic in the extreme, such that the list could readily be greatly lengthened, they are nevertheless sufficient for my purpose in this context, since they allow me to make a clear distinction between

   i. *Acephalous tribes*: political jurisdictions ordered around relatively shallow hierarchical networks, with little or nothing in the way of a central source of governance: typically found amongst hunters and gatherers, as well as amongst transhumant herdsmen
   ii. *Kingdoms and Emirates*: Powerfully centralised forms of Jurisprudence presiding over a clearly marked territory composed of farmers, craftsmen, and administrators; typically found in areas capable for high-surplus agricultural production.
   iii. *Empires*: Even more powerful and yet more widely extended political jurisdictions, heavily reliant on taxes to sustain its central administration, and incorporating a wide range of subordinate jurisdictions including a multiplicity of subordinate Kingdoms,

Emirates, Markets, and Trade Routes, accompanied by substantial military force to maintain the integrity of governance throughout the imperial jurisdiction.

From this perspective the key feature of an Empire is not just the extent of the territory which it controls; rather it most distinctive feature is that that its political jurisdiction reaches over a multiplicity of differently structured socio-religious orders (in other words a wide range of kingdoms, emirates, sects, chiefdoms and all manner of more or less acephalous tribes), all of which pay homage to a single central authority. In the course of all this the key function of the Emperor is to maintain law and order throughout his realm, to ensure that the roads within it are well patrolled such that both pilgrimages long-distance trade can be conducted in safety, and that large-scale infrastructural initiatives – typically irrigation canals – are both built and comprehensively maintained in good order. It also follows that to achieve these outcomes, Empires also need to develop thoroughly professional administrative systems, whose key role is to collect the taxes required to keep the whole edifice in stable financial order – not least in order to maintain a well-trained army, whose function is not only to protect the Imperial boundaries from external predators, and to enforce the payment of taxes if recalcitrant components of the structure seek to gain political autonomy on their own account.

Empires of this kind have a long history, reaching back to several millennia before the start of the Christian era. Moreover the overseas empires created by the Western European powers during the during the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were also ordered in just the same way, even if they were further conditioned by the caveats which I have outlined above. However with historical hindsight in mind, it is now apparent that those caveats had far-reaching consequences, both in terms of the way in which they were administered as they grew, and above all with respect to the outcomes which followed in the aftermath of their exceptionally speedy collapse.

From a historical perspective Imperial, or to put it more specifically, *dynastic* collapse was far from unusual, as the poet's representation of the claims of Ozymandias serve to remind us. For the past four millennia empires have thrived and subsequently collapsed, either as a result of internal dissent of one kind or another, or as a result of invasion from elsewhere. However the location of almost all historical empires was heavily geographically conditioned, normally in fertile valleys of major river basins, so as one such edifice

collapsed, another invariably soon emerged to replace its predecessor. Moreover whilst imperial collapse invariably led to a great deal of chaos before order was restored, the intrinsically pluralistic character of imperial orders was such that the greatest degree of chaos occurred at the peak of the edifice as new dynasties replaced their predecessors. Moreover if the new dynast was to make the most of his victory, the last he would want to see was the collapse of his predecessor's tax-gathering mechanism. Hence in the aftermath of dynastic collapse the experience of those at the lower end the imperial hierarchy – be they farmers, herdsmen, craftsmen or traders – suffered far less disruption than those at its peak; hence whilst incoming dynasts invariably dismissed their predecessors personal advisers, regional governors and so forth, whose loyalty they could not trust, conditions in the lower orders of the system remained largely untouched, such that the whole of the prior structure was rapidly revived with relatively little structural change.

4   Jurisprudence

A high level of administrative competence is a necessary prerequisite if imperial stability is to be sustained. Hence whilst Emperors are nominally all-powerful, they are in practice wholly reliant on the competence and the loyalty of the administrators who are responsible for both civil and military affairs, who together provide the 'steel frame' which serves to hold the whole edifice together. Administrative collapse spells the end of that particular Imperial episode. But whilst this administrative framework runs by definition through the entire hierarchical order, from peasant-farmers who deliver a substantial component of their crop into Imperial granaries, thereby contributing to a vast flow of taxes into the Imperial treasury, and which is used in turn to provide a stable order all the way down to the tax payers, this is by no means the only jurisprudential order which sustains the imperial structure. It is easy to see why. Whilst all sections of administrative hierarchies follow the same set of rules and regulations, one of the key features of all imperial structures is that the incorporate a wide range of more localised communities, whose internal socio-cultural characteristics are by definition infinitely diverse. How, then, is this condition of intrinsic diversity within the Empire best managed?

Two options are ultimately available. Having gained control of vast territories as a result of military success, hubristically oriented Emperors, together with their immediate henchmen often dream of imposing a new form of civilization – their own, of course – on their newly

acquired subjects. Such enterprises rarely last long: if the vast majority of those subject to militarily imposed imperial sovereignty are perfectly happy with their own well-established socio-cultural conventions, efforts to require them to abandon those conventions in favour of the religio-cultural expectations of alien hegemons lording it over them are invariable precipitate active resistance. Worse still – at least from an imperial perspective – local communities regularly forget their differences and past quarrels; instead they rise up together in a collective insurgency, and in doing so threaten the integrity of the Empire itself. Myopic hubris routinely spells the death of Empire.

There is, however, another option: namely to accept that the population of the Empire is inherently plural both ethnic and religious terms, and that the prospect of achieving civilizational homogeneity – however the Emperor might wish to achieve such a condition – is entirely unrealistic. If so, it followed that the only fundamental duties with which Imperial subjects had to conform was an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of Imperial powers, and a willingness to pay their taxes in return for Imperial protection; and that provided that they conformed with these prescriptions, subjects of the Empire could organise their personal lives as the chose. Imperial structures which pursued this course were invariably far more stable than those which became entangled in the demands of unrealistic hubris.

5   Dar ul-Islam

As empires go, those which emerged under the aegis of Dar ul-Islam have proved to be more stable, more long-lived, and more geographically extended than any other, since in its heyday its jurisdictions spread all the way from the Atlantic to the Pacific; and although the integrity of most of is ancient jurisdictions have declined – and all too many have collapsed – in the post-colonial era, it still remains a global force to be reckoned with.

Dar ul-Islam has a long history, reaching back for fourteen hundred year. However from a political perspective it can conveniently be divided into three broad periods: firstly a period of rapid military expansion – which did not begin until several years after the Prophet's death – in which Saracen warrior to took advantage of the temporary weakness of both the Byzantine and Sassanid Empires, as a result of which they were able to establish military hegemony in a wide strip of territory running all the way from the Atlantic through North Africa and the Levant, and on through Mesopotamia and Khorasan. However at this stage

they had little interest in establishing a fully-fledged Empire (or Empires) in their own right: rather Saracens' key objective was to extract as much loot as possible from the remains of the prosperous Empires they had over-ran, and to carry it back to the Umayyad headquarters located in Damascus. The result of all this was predictable: despite having gained military control over vast territories, the Umayyad dynasty had failed to establish a viable system of governance. Hence after Abu Hashim was assassinated in 743, Dar ul-Islam underwent a radical sea-change. On the one hand the Shi'a (the party of Ali) parted company with the Sunnis, whilst the Abbasids took over the Caliphate and moved its headquarters from the Damascus to the city of Baghdad on the banks of the Tigris – in the heart of what once had once been the mighty Sassanid Empire.

All this led to a sea-change in the structure of Dar ul-Islam. When the Caliphate arrived in Baghdad – a city explicitly constructed to receive it – Mesopotamia, Iran and Khorasan had already had a long history of empires and dynasties which had come and gone during past millennia, in the course of which it had gained a great deal of experience as to how best to order imperial governance. That was not all, however. By then what was still left of the intellectual heartland of the Sassanid dynasty had moved even further to the east to Khorasan – essentially the well-watered plains of Khorasan, located between the Amu and Syr Darya (known to the Greeks the Oxus and the Jaxartes) – which stood at the cross roads of all of the Euro-Asiatic trading routes. Hence if Dar ul-Islam initially came into existence in the hands of the rough-hewn hands of the of the military Saracens, it was amongst the scholars Khorasan that a much more mature vision of Imperial Dar ul-Islam came into existence, from where their findings were promulgated around the world by the Caliphate in Baghdad during the course of the next four centuries (Starr: 2013).

6   Processes of religious and socio-cultural reconstruction

Socio-cultural orders are complex phenomena, and in no way do they step fully-fledged out of the blue: rather they invariably come into being as revisions and reinterpretations of older traditions. Moreover the more complex the order in question – and there are few more complex orders than those which underpin imperial governance – the more the outcome will be a melange of reinterpretations an extensive range of prior traditions, even when, and perhaps especially when, the outcome is held by believers to have been a revelation deliberately inspired by God himself.

With this in mind it is worth noting that whilst Dar ul-Islam shares Abrahamic roots with both Judaism and Christianity, so much so that Mohammed is routinely identified as a second Adam, and hence the seal of Prophetic tradition, it has nevertheless developed along a very different trajectory from that followed by its Jewish and Christian predecessors. Moreover there are also good reasons to suggest that it has quite geographical different roots: Mecca and Medina are located in the Hejaz, not in Jerusalem or even the Levant; meanwhile the premises which underpin Dar ul-Islam as we know it today were not formulated in Jerusalem, but rather in Khorasan, the furthermost corner of the Imperial Mashriq; moreover if that was indeed the case that the vision of Dar ul-Islam which emerged during the course of Baghdad-based Abbasid caliphate was powerfully conditioned by the religio-cultural traditions in play in specific geographical of context within which the whole edifice was ultimately fashioned.

In previous centuries Jerusalem had been the crossroads between Egypt, Mesopotamia and cities surrounding the Mediterranean and such that both the Jewish and the Christian traditions were powerfully conditioned by the complex geographically specific experiences to which they were exposed. But although Islam emerged as a successor to both traditions, it is becoming steadily clearer that Dar ul-Islam emerged in the midst of a yet more significant cross-road, since Khorasan stood at the intersection of trading routes running to and from China, India, Mesopotamia, the Levant, and Egypt, and beyond that to the far distant lands of northern and western Europe. Moreover in no way did these traders simply facilitate circulation of goods around the Eurasian landmass: rather they also facilitated the circulation of religious and cultural premises, as well as scholarly experts both in search of knowledge, as well distributing their own findings to other scholars whom they met on their travels.

In consequence Khorasan rapidly became Eurasia's most complex, as well as its most sophisticated, intellectual clearing house. Prior to the arrival of the Saracen raiders from the south of the Amu Darya, Khorasan supported three major religio-cultural traditions: the Shamanistic premises herdsmen, hunters and gatherers from the steppes and forests of Siberian, the long standing Zoroastrian tradition of successive Persian Empires, and last but not least, followers the Sahajiyya variant of the Mahayana Buddhist tradition, who had arrived from India the best part of a millennium previously, and who were by now as well rooted in Khorasan as the Zoroastrians. Moreover with the further opening from the west, the

population also included a substantial Jewish and Nestorian Christian scholarly presence, all of whom lived side by side in a socio-cultural order which was strongly plural in character.

As the Muslim intruders began to settle themselves into their new and exceedingly prosperous environment they found themselves confronted with a plethora of religious and socio-cultural sources of inspiration on which to draw as they set about providing Dar ul-Islam with more stable jurisprudential foundations, in what turned out to be an immensely productive process mutual conceptual inspiration. Drawing on the Nestorian Christians' knowledge of Greek philosophy and geometry, Jewish traditions of legal scholarship, Zoroastrian systems of public administration, Hindu mathematics, and last but not least on the mystical inspiration of the *sahajiyya* tradition at heart of Mahayana Buddhism, the scholars of Khorasan – the greater part of whom appear to have converts from Buddhism – applied themselves to the foundations of the Prophet's revelations to construct what still remain they key conceptual foundations of Dar ul-Islam. As this occurred Dar ul-Islam ceased to be a specifically Levantine, let alone an Arab phenomenon. To be sure Arabic rapidly became the scholarly *lingua franca* shortly after the arrival of Muslim political dominance in the form of the Caliphate, such that all the scholarly debates which drove these ongoing processes of mutual inspiration were conducted in Arabic; however the context within which the premises and practices around which Islam's Imperial structures would in future be built had relatively little to do with developments in the Levant: rather they were a product of the conceptual and historical resource available at an even more diverse cross-roads lying fifteen hundred miles further to the east.

7   Three Dimensions of Governance in Dar ul-Islam: *Shari'at, Siasat* and *Tariqat*

Wherever it occurs, and however it is justified, conquest is invariably both a violent and a lawless phenomenon. That was certainly the case as Saracen armies emerged from the Levant in a massive Jihad, such that in in less than a century they gained control of vast swathe territory which stretched from the Atlantic Ocean to the steppes of Khorasan on behalf of the Caliphate in Damascus – and, of course, to their own substantial benefit in the form of loot. Had matters stopped there, this whole structure could well have fallen apart – just as happened in the case of Alexander the Great, whose conquests covered much the same ground, and were almost as extensive as, those achieved by the Saracen jihadis. However in the Islamic case central authority was preserved in the institution of the Caliphate; moreover

even if the Umayyads were effectively robber kings, as the Shi'as insisted, the nature of that office underwent a sea-change as it was taken over by the Abbasids, and its headquarters was relocated from Damascus to Baghdad. With this, the stage was at long last set for the emergence of imperial Dar ul-Islam.

As ever, the new imperial structure was built on the foundations of its local predecessors, which in this case was neither Jerusalem nor Rome nor Byzantium: instead the principal sources on which the founders of Dar ul-Islam relied were specifically oriental in character, since the local models jurisprudence and governance with which they were familiar were Zoroastrian and Buddhist in character (Das Gupta: 1946). However if there was one key dimension of their Abrahamic roots which they continues to sustain, namely that if order was be to sustained, Royal edicts must as far as possible be conditioned by scholarly law-making, it was also one which was even more vigorously reinforced by the long standing scholarly traditions of Mesopotamia and Khorasan. Given these foundations, as the classical jurisprudence began to take shape, the powers of the Caliphate, *siasat* (politics) were steadily trimmed, but by no means eliminated: On the one hand it was significantly constrained by personal guidance set out in the *shari'a*, prepared by and interpreted by the *ulema* (scholars), and on the other by *tariqa*, mystical networks developed by Sheikhs and Pirs based in the form of gnostic interpretations of the meaning and purpose of both the Qur'an and the cosmic order in which the source of all existence had manifested his Being. Woven together on a complex basis, these three distinct vectors of thought and action provided the premises which underpinned the classical structure of Dar ul-Islam.

In the context of this volume the concept of *siasat* is the easiest of these perspectives to explain: in its righteous form it covers all the wide range of manoeuvres in which the sovereign can legitimately engage in order to sustain the integrity of his Empire; however it also follows that *siasat* also includes all the less than licit manoeuvres in which rivals are engaged in an effort to undermine the integrity the established order. Hence whilst those engaged in *siasat* are expected to comply with the premises of *shari'a* in their personal lives, when it comes to engaging in political manoeuvres all bets are deemed to be off: in these circumstances those in power, and/or seeking to gain access to it, can legitimately follow all the tricks in the trade laid out in the ancient Hindu *Arthashastra*, which were subsequently articulated by Machiavelli.

By contrast the essence of *shari'a* – which in contemporary contexts is all too often interpreted as if it was Law in an Austinian sense – is best understood as personally oriented guidance with which Muslims should seek to order their behaviour, and such that their entire lifestyle is structured in such a way as that it is congruent as possible with the exemplary life of *Insaan-e Kamil,* the perfect man, of in other words the Prophet Mohammed. However the Shari'ah itself was very much man-made: rooted in careful scrutiny of both the *Qur'an* and *hadith* – much of which was initially conducted by converted scholars of many backgrounds in Khorasan – the *Shari'a* is in no sense a carefully structured legal code. Rather it is best described an encyclopaedic set of commentaries which the *'ulema* have created over the centuries, in an effort to establish the precise form of ideal behavioural practices which should be followed by Muslims in every conceivable context.

But if the *'ulema* were consequently in a position to offer *fatwa*, scholarly advice, in response to questions put to them by laymen, there was no way in which the *'ulema* – or indeed those who had sought their advice – could enforce their opinions; moreover there was no formal hierarchy of scholarship, especially in the Sunni tradition – so in principle no one *fatwa* had greater traction than another. However that did not mean that the *shari'a* did not give rise to effective jurisprudence in the real world: rather that was implemented by a sub-division of *'ulema,* the Qazis, who engaged in *usul-ul fiqh,* who looked to broad inspiration from the premises of Shari'a, not so much to punish and reward, but rather to settle disputes which litigants had brought before them on an equitable basis. Moreover in doing so the Qazis in no sense 'enforced the Shari'a': for the, equity came first. Hence their prime objective was to smooth over the ruptures which had emerged in the social order, either by engineering a reconciliation between the contending parties in such a way as to ensure that the structure of the network from which the litigants were drawn was suitably repaired, or – if that proved quite impossible – to restructure networks in in such a way as to eliminate the underlying contradictions. Hence whilst the Qadis were undoubtedly profoundly inspired by the prayerful supplication *Bismillah e-Rehman e-Rahim* in the course of exercising jurisprudence, in no way did they note treat the contents of Shari'a as a code-book to which they could straightforwardly turn as an abstract source of immediately solutions; hence whilst keeping its premises broadly in mind, they invariably approached the issues before them on a *contextual* basic, with the result that they also took careful cognisance *'urf* and *riwaj*, the

customary premises and practices deployed with the specific community from which the litigants were drawn, since their ultimate objective was to restore the integrity of the local order (Hallaq: 2009)

Hence the Shari'a was in no way *enforced* by rulers. Instead its premises were interpreted on a contextual basis of the process of *usul-ul fiqh* – preferably, but by no means necessarily deployed by a *Qazi*: any respected elder within the community could fulfil this role, with the objective of resolving disputes on an equitable basis, and in doing repair the fabric of the social order. In other words this dimension of Islamic jurisprudence was community-based, and implemented for the benefit of the public at large, no less for non-Muslims than Muslims, and at least in principle, to the rulers themselves. However there was also a sense in which the ruler was the final backstop: if a community could not resolve its internal difficulties, the ruler was entitled – and indeed expected – to come in with a big stick by issuing a unilateral enforceable Firman.

Several points are worth noting in the light of all this. First of all, this dimension of everyday jurisprudence and conflict resolution – *usul-al fiqh*, in other words – stood wholly apart from *Qanoon*, the administrative jurisprudence articulated by the state on hierarchical basis. Secondly it was a more or less informal, and hence an exceedingly flexible mode of jurisprudence. Thirdly, and most significantly, it had no difficulty in dealing with ethno-sectarian plurality, no less within the framework of Dar ul-Islam itself, than with respect to members of Jewish and Christian communities, all of which had their own distinctive forms of 'urf and *riwaj.* Last but not least, neither *Qanoon* nor *usul-ul fiqh* were strictly religious in character. To be sure both forms of jurisprudence looked to the Qur'an for inspiration, but in doing so they overlooked the greater part of the contents of the Qur'an, which takes the form of a poetic – and above all a *mystical* appreciation of the powers of *Al-Huqq*, in other words the source of all existence, the Creator of the universe, the special place which *insaan*, mankind, occupies within it, and hence the debt which we owe to the Source for bringing us into existence. All this gave rise to the third key dimension of Dar ul-Islam, *Tariqa*, the means by which the spiritual foundations of the new faith was rapidly transmitted to, and adopted by, the vast swathe of populations which the Saracens overran. Nor was that all: the Sufi *Tariqa* (spiritual pathways) swiftly became the conceptual mainstay of the whole edifice, so much as that as *usul-ul fiqh* was swept away by rampant *siasat* in the course of Dar ul-

Islam's encounter with Imperially-driven the premises of European Enlightenment, little is left of the other two key elements of classical Islam, Sufi tradition continues to thrive.

At least at first sight the premises of the Sufi tradition are wholly Abrahamic in character: its roots lie in the story of Genesis, and goes on to present Mohammed as the seal of prophets (including Jesus of Nazareth), and hence as a second Adam. But whilst the Qur'an makes constant reference to this Abrahamic cosmology, it is also shot through with a radically different cosmological vision, whose premises are wholly absent Jewish, Christian and Greek traditions, but which play a large role in the *sahajiyya* version of Mahayana Buddhism, and prior to the, the Upanishads. Hence whilst the Shari'a spelt out the way in which Muslims should order their behaviour in physical terms, from a Sufi perspective the next stage is a great deal more challenging: namely by applying oneself to follow Prophet's exemplary spiritual path – which ultimately culminated in a rapturous *personal* encounter with *al-Huqq.* This ultimately led a mystical experience in which all the veils which otherwise surrounded unfathomable One were temporarily lifted – such that all distinctions between the Source of all existence and its physical manifestation evaporated. Hence the ultimate goal of those who took the Sufi path was to reach the mystical condition of *fanā*, "passing away" or "annihilation" (of the self), in which individual ego breaks down in in the face of an awareness of and ecstatic unity of macrocosm *al-Huqq* and microcosm of the devotee's temporarily now annihilated personal. It also follows that in the context of everyday human existence such an experience can never provide the lover more than an occasional fleeting glimpse of the Beloved. Hence when Sufi masters – commonly identifies as Pirs, Sheikhs and Faqirs pass away, their departure is celebrated annually, not as funeral but rather as a marriage, *'urs*, since it marks a spot at which a lover has found permanent reunion with his Beloved.

But whilst all this is far removed from the standard Abrahamic vision of cosmology developed in the Levant, in Buddhist Khorasan an alternative vision had long been available, in the form of the much more ancient Indic *sahajiyya* tradition, whose key aspects Das Gupta outlines as follows:

> The Sahajiyas were averse to the elaborate formalities of religion, and concentrated their whole attention on the attainment of the blissful ultimate nature as the highest truth, for which they took help of the natural propensities of man. Deepest was their hatred towards those recondite scholars who would try to know the truth through discursive reason. Tillo-pada says that the truth which can fully be realised only by

the self, can never be known by the scholars, for, what comes within the scope of our mind, can never be the absolute truth. Kanha-pada also says that the scholars who generally depend on their reason and scholarship, are indifferent to (or rather ignorant of) the true path of religion. As Saraha says, 'Those who go on reciting and explaining, cannot know the truth, it is not only unknown, but also unknowable to them. Those who do not drink eagerly (to their heart's content) the nectar of the instructions of the Guru, die of thirst like fools deceived by the mirage of the desert.'

Scholars explain the scriptures, but do not know of the Buddha who is residing in their own body; by such scholarship they can never escape the cycle of coming and going. Yet those shameless creatures think themselves to be Pundits. People pride themselves that the secret of the great truth has long been in their keeping, but Kanha says that even out of crores of people rarely does one become absorbed in perfectly pure truth.

[Ritual] is of no avail unless Truth is realised. Deceived is the whole world by false illusion, none does know the all-excelling truth where both religion and non-religion become one. By all these they merely lead themselves astray and never attain perfection (Dasgupta 1969: 53-56).

8 The Abbasid Caliphate and the emergence of the sinews of Dar ul-Islam

In the light of all this there are excellent reasons for suggesting that the sinews of came to be recognised as the classical structure of Dar ul-Islam came into being under the aegis of the Abbasid Caliphate, which came in being into being in 750 CE, and finally collapsed in 1258, when Mongolian Saracens led by Hugulu (one of Genghis Khan's grandsons), sacked Baghdad just over half a millennium later in 1258. Moreover by then the tripartite division which had originally emerged in Khorasan had been deployed in the multiplicity of Islamic regimes which had come into being in a vast area running from Andalusia on to the Indian subcontinent and into the islands and peninsulas of South East Asia.

Although much of this process of territorial expansion was achieved by means of martial conquest, *siasat* remained an elite sport. Hence so long as taxes continued to roll in from their new-found subjects, converting them to Islam was not a pressing concern. However the emergence of Tariqa had far reaching consequences: it was charismatic Sufi Murshids, Pirs, and Marabouts who were primarily responsible for spreading the spiritual, conceptual and cosmological foundations of Islam on a global scale – giving rise to a process of quiet proselytization which continues to this day. In doing so the Sufis' initial approach to conversion was not so much by rubbishing the established premises of the communities to which they attached themselves, but rather by subtly reinterpreting local forms popular

cosmology – typically articulated in legend, poetry and song – in such a way to as to reconstruct indigenous premises steadily more congruent with their own.

This was, of course, a straightforward task amongst communities who were already familiar with Indic conceptual orders, but which nevertheless also proved to be almost as attractive to those whose cosmological vision had been constrained by the limitations of Judaism and Christianity. Nevertheless this was far from being an obstacle either to conversion, or indeed to the development of further insights by scholars whose roots were far distant from Khorasan. Hence, for example, Muḥyiddin ibn ʿArabi who was born and educated in Andalusia, and conceptually inspired by Shaykh Majduddīn Isḥāq in Nishapur, is still regarded to this day as the prince of Sufi masters throughout the length and breadth of Dar ul-Islam – and all the way from local devotees out in the backwoods to no less a figure than Ayatollah Khomeini.

But if encounters with the Tariqa was normally the first step towards incorporation of non-Muslim communities into the edifice of Dar ul-Islam, the next step was to introduce them to the premises of the Shar'ia. Once again we have to look carefully at just what this entailed, given that the advisory contents of the Shari'a can usefully be divided into two distinct categories. Hence whilst the greater part of the opening sections deal focus on matters of prayer, including the ways in which one's personal condition of wholesome purity should be maintained prior to bowing down in prayers to the Almighty, actions which can conveniently be identified as spiritual advice, whilst the remainder of the text focus on more specifically moral issues, in the sense that provides equally detailed advise as premises of mutuality around which Muslims should order inter-personal transactions in the course of every conceivable aspects of daily life. Moreover as we saw earlier, the advice it sets out is essentially both idealistic and voluntary, such that there was no means by which this advice could be enforced by the state: no matter how extensive a ruler's power to exercise *Siasat* might be, his role was confined to maintenance of the political hierarchy, rather than intervening in the settlement of local disputes. However this is in no way to suggest that the premises of Shari'ah had no traction when it came to resolving contradictions which routinely erupted within the local communities which provided the foundations of the wider order: in those contexts it was *'usul-ul fiqh* which was wheeled out as the most appropriate form of dispute settlement, in the course of which the objective of the whole exercise was to repair

and reconstruct splits and tears which had erupted within networks of interpersonal reciprocity. But if the aim was consequently to establish the integrity of that section of the social order, it also followed that whoever brokered that outcome – whether he was a Maulvi, a Pir or a respected elder – the premises on which relied on invariably relied on *'urf* and *riwaj*, local custom, underlined by (often fictional) references the Qur'an and the Hadith as and when that appeared to be appropriate.

9   Imperial Collapse

No less than any other such imperial edifice, the empires which emerged from under the aegis of Dar were subject to periodic collapse. Hence even though Muslims have long sought to identify themselves as an *Umma* – in other words as an egalitarian brotherhood – with the exception of the brief period during which four *rashidun khilafat* stepped successively into the shoes of the Prophet in the aftermath of his death, the *Umma* has never been politically united. Since then there have been all manner of internal secessions, as for example when the Shi'as split with the Sunnis, the defeat of a Caliphate and its reconstruction elsewhere, as in the case of the Umayyads and the Abbasids, and worst of all, as a result of conquest by non-Muslin outsiders. Two such incidents of the kind are worth considering in the context: firstly the Mongol invasion of Khorasan, which put paid to the Abbasid Caliphate in the twelfth century CE, and the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate – and indeed the extinction of political eight centuries later.

External conquest is invariably deeply destructive established institutions, especially when it is implemented by predators in search of booty, and all the more so when their immediate targets are in poor shape. From that perspective Genghis Khan's raiders did even more damage than the Saracens during their initial period of conquest, thanks to their mobility, their skills in warfare, and above all the readiness to obliterate all the major institutions – from cities to irrigation systems – which they encountered in course of their depredations, before returning to the steppes of Mongolia with their accumulated loot. Hence whilst their destruction of irrigation systems which had been developed during the course of many previous centuries was a major blow to farmers, the loot they sought was for the most part concentrated in major cities, whose inhabitants they attacked mercilessly – with the resultant the those who had hitherto responsible for both governance scholarship were quite literally wiped out. But whilst the upper levels of the edifice of Dar-ul may have been more or less eliminated all this, its popular dimension of *usul-al fiqh*, of *'ur* and *riwaj,* and above all the

oral traditions of epic tales, poetry and song serve to sustain spiritual, conceptual and cosmological foundations of Dar ul-Islam. So it was when Khorasan's Timurid conquerors eventually began to adopt the premises Islam, and in due course set about constructing what in due course proved to be highly successful Sultanates for themselves in both Samarkand and Delhi. But however prosperous both these Sultanates may have grown by deploying the three key sinews of *Siasat, Sharia* and *Tariqa*, none of them generated anything like the degree of intellectual, philosophical, scientific and metaphysical excitement of the kind which was generated in what Abbasid Khorasan (Starr 2013). Be that as it may, as a result of these developments all three dimensions of Dar ul-Islam found their way back onto the road as the Turkic Timurids steadily abandoned their former Buddhist heritage in favour of the premises of Islam.

Nevertheless much changed in imperial terms as a result of the Mongol onslaught; Baghdad lost its position as the home of the imperial Caliphate, to be replaced by numerous rather more localised (but nevertheless geographically extended) Sultanates in Delhi, Samarkand, Cairo, Istanbul, and Cordoba, many of which sought to identify themselves as the real home to the Khilafat. But whilst such claims amounted to a multiplicity of politically grounded contradictions, such issues were largely confined to the sphere of Siayasat. Meanwhile the other two dimensions of Dar ul-Islam, Shari'a and all its appendages on the one hand, and the many streams of Tariqat on the other, continued to thrive across the length and breadth of Dar ul-Islam, since at anything other than a military level, imperial boundaries were thoroughly porous, most especially for scholars, traders and pilgrims.

However that is in no way to suggest that Dar ul-Islam was in any way a uniform entity in socio-cultural terms. Whilst appreciation of the merits of the premises of Islam grew steadily in vast region over which it had cast its administrative nets, leading to a steady flow of converts, in no way this lead to homogeneity. To be sure Arabic became the vehicle of scholarship, just as was the case with Latin in western European Christian contexts, and both Shari'a and Tariqa became the guiding lights of moral and spiritual inspiration, these premises were everywhere adjusted in such a way that they could be readily be articulated through local languages, local notions of custom and practice, and local cosmologies, all of which could be steadily be rendered steadily greater congruence with the core *principles*

around which Dar ul-Islam had been constructed – so much so that plurality was the name of the game.

10   The Arrival of European Empires

As we saw earlier, given their Christian – and especially their Protestant – foundations, as European Empires expanded around the globe, they drew on very different conceptual premises, especially as their progressive visions of Enlightenment took off. Hence even though these Empires were initially driven by the same imperatives as the Saracens and the Mongols, their level of disdain for those whom they conquered was so intense that they saw no point in removing their headquarters into the midst of the vast territories over which they had established political hegemony, let alone to indigenise themselves by taking aboard the premises and practices of those over whom they ruled. By the beginning of the nineteenth century they had become firmly committed to the opposite view: namely that the core justification for their imperial adventures was not so much the pursuit of scientific discovery, let alone an appreciation of the social, cultural, technical and religious achievements of their new-found subjects: rather it was to assist 'the natives' move from darkness into light, and to appreciate the intrinsic superiority of all things of European origin, most especially in the form of its crowning glory: Christianity.

But even if the efforts of a multiplicity of missionaries brought about very few conversions in Dar ul-Islam, the overarching force of European Empire, no less in technical than in military spheres, together with their absolute refusal to take significant cognisance of the premises and practices of new-found subjects, presented the inhabitants of Dar ul-Islam with an unprecedented challenge. In sharp contrast to all previous invaders, there was no apparent prospect of assimilating, and in the longer run of integrating the foreigners into the structure of Dar ul-Islam. In the face of this monstrous Leviathan, only two solutions appeared to be available: either to retreat beyond its borders to prepare the foundations of a *jihad*; or to stay put in a condition of resilience (*subr*) in order to appreciate – and to take advantage of – the technical and administrative strengths of the invaders, in the hope that in good time the civilization of Dar ul-Islam could eventually be restored. In these circumstances the great majority of Muslims took the latter route.

However the invaders took little cognisance of these fantasies: instead they set out to tame the ignorant, recalcitrant and superstitious natives on their own preferred terms, primarily

those of the European enlightenment. However in the midst of the vastness of Dar ul-Islam, fully fledged military conquest of all its many components proved to be unrealistic. Hence whilst they had no hesitation to bring all the most prosperous – as well as the most aggressive – areas under their direct rule, most usually in the aftermath of military conquest, they also laid off the burden of governance by pressing all manner of local rulers to sign no-aggression treaties with the ever-expanding Raj, who were consequently allowed to continue govern their subjects as they always had done, albeit under the constant scrutiny of a powerful British Resident.

But if what came to be described as 'Indirect Rule' was consequently imposed in all the remoter parts and subservient parts of the sub-continent, in true broadly non-interventional style of most previous Empires, most of the major cities, and most of the most prosperous agricultural districts – typically located in fertile and well watered river valleys and deltas – established practices were steadily swept to one side, to be replaced by the strongly centralised Iron Frame of colonial governance and administration, all of whose senior members were recruited into the Indian Civil services from Britain's leading public schools, whilst Viceroys (who usually only served for short stints) were invariably of aristocratic backgrounds. For good reasons members of the ICS, let alone the Viceroy, were soon routinely identified as 'Heaven Born'.

11   Developments in the course of the emergence of a post-colonial global order

However Britain's Indian Raj was not to last along. As Mantena accurately observes, this magnificent entity turned out to have reached the apogee of its pomp in the early years of the twentieth century, after which it crumbled with remarkable speed less than half a century earlier. As he puts it

> At the peak of imperial confidence in nineteenth-century Britain, when the project of liberal reform (and its program of remaking the world in its own image) encountered resistance, its universalism gave way to harsh attitudes about the intractable differences among people, the inscrutability of other ways of life, and the ever-present potential for racial and cultural conflict. When empire faced opposition or produced consequences that did not fit neatly into its vision of progress, the error was understood to lie less with the structure of imperial power, and the contradictions ensuing from its attempt to elicit social transformation through force, than in the nature of colonized societies themselves. Resistance, especially political resistance, when refracted through the imperial lens, was re-described as a deep-seated cultural intransigence to universal norms of civilization. (Mantena 2010: 9)

 How, though, did this resistance to alien governance take shape in the case of Dar ul-Islam? At least from an external – and above all a European – perspective, all resistance to their premises appears to have been utterly futile. In between the fall of the Shah-in-Shah of Delhi in the aftermath of the 1857 rebellion ('mutiny' from the British perspective) and the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in the aftermath of the First World War, all of Dar ul-Islam's many Sultanates and Emirates were either absorbed into European empires, or failing that became the their 'Protectorates'. But whilst the collapse of Sultanates and Emirates in the face of alien invaders was no way novel in the history of Dar ul-Islam, in the aftermath of which their Islamised successors stepped into their predecessor's shoes, no revivals were available this time round. Little did they know it, but the age of Empires was over. Following two episode of Global warfare, all the European Empires collapsed, and the United States – a state which was even more strongly committed to the libertarian premises of the European enlightenment than any of its predecessors – emerged as an anti-colonial a global hegemon. Hence as empires of all kind were swept comprehensively into abeyance, to be replaced (at least in principle by the United Nations and its many offshoots, states rapidly emerged as the only form of governance which was deemed to be acceptable in what had become an increasingly globalised world order.

In the midst of all this the revival of Dar ul-Islam appears to have been rendered virtually impossible. But just why is it this so? Is it because Islamic norms of governance were inherently inferior to those which emerged in the course the European enlightenment? But if that was indeed the case, how did Muslims, having in the past commanded a great civilization and built many empires, rule themselves? What form of governance did they practice whilst doing so with such success? And how and why has their capacity to do make such achievements evaporated with such speed? With such questions in mind Hallaq (2013) has recently suggested that rather than scrutinizing classical forms of governance in Dar ul-Islam in an effort to identify its inherent weaknesses, it is much more profitable to turn the tables by exploring the impact of nearly two centuries of history, shot through with consequences colonial rule, which gave rise to even more chaotic postcolonial developments, ranging right across the scale from commitments to fictional sectional nationalism to neo-fundamentalistic religious revivalism – code in each case by one dimension or another of the premises of the European enlightenment. As we saw right at the outset, Hallaq recently observed that

Postcolonial nationalist elites maintained the structures of power they had inherited from the colonial experience and that, as a rule and after gaining so-called independence for their countries, they often aggressively pursued the very same colonial policies they had fiercely fought against during the colonial period. They inherited from Europe a readymade nation-state (with its constitutive power structures) for which the existing social formations had not been adequately prepared. The paradigmatic concept of the citizen, without which no state can last, has been slow in coming, and the political lacunae left after the collapse of the traditional structures have not been properly filled.

The nation-state thus sits uncomfortably in the Muslim world, as evidenced in the rise of the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the state apparatus has subordinated and disfigured Sharia's norms of governance, leading to the failure of both Islamic governance and the modern state as political projects. Nor have the other Muslim countries fared any better, because the political organization they adopted from and after colonialism has been and remains authoritarian and oppressive and because their integration of Shari'a as a mode of governance has hardly paid anything more than lip service to the original. The failure, in other words, has shown itself at nearly all levels. (Hallaq 2013: 1-2)

But if this is so, just why was it that in aftermath of its encounter with the invasive premises of the European enlightenment, even when European empires collapsed, there was no jurisdiction any jurisdiction around the globe –with the possible exception of Saudi Arabia – in which classical forms of Islamic governance have emerged as the European tide went out. In making sense of the developments – or rather these non-developments – it is worth remembering that it was in no way the case that the popular dimensions of Dar ul-Islam – namely Shar'ia and Tariqa – evaporated: on the contrary *'urf* and *riwaj,* remained in place as customary law, just as the *sufi* tradition remained a source of inspiration in Muslim communities at large. In other words both the moral and the spiritual dimension of Dar ul-Islam remained firmly in place – always provided that those who drew on its resources could keep the premises of the European enlightenment at bay. It followed that systemic failure was not precipitated by either of these forces: rather is came about as a result of a failure to restore *siasat*, Islamic conventions of governance.

Whilst this failure had many sources, it was largely a result of failures amongst the indigenous elite which emerged – and whose interests were actively promoted in and by state-supported institutions during the colonial period. Education was the key. Largely taught by Christian missionaries, the new indigenous elite was introduced to a syllabus which was taught in the colonist's language, which promptly became – and remains – the *lingua franca* of the new-found elite. Moreover the content of the syllabus they follows was also 'progressive' in character, and hence closely congruent with syllabi deployed back in their

master's Imperial heartland. Hence whilst most Muslim students resisted the efforts of their teachers to convert, they were nevertheless introduced to a conceptual universe of science, mathematics, literature and philosophy which was wholly European in character, and with which they all found themselves deeply impressed – even though they were also itching to see the indigenous order freed from colonial dominance, as their masters promised was just around the corner, even if the corner was never reached. Nevertheless they did not turn their backs on modernity. Rather they practiced *subr*: they continued to learn all they could about the secrets of European wealth and power, in order to gain the capacity to cast off colonial rule, such that they once again regain their distinctive identity, and above all their autonomy.

It followed that when Imperial collapse at long last occurred, it was the products of this educational system who took over the reins from their predecessors. It was that at this point that the failures which have become ever more disastrous as the years have passed took place. However patriotic the officials who took over the colonial iron frame may have been, there was a strong sense in which they had been deracinated during the course of their education and training, so much so that they adopted the same mind-set of their predecessors, albeit on behalf of 'the nation', rather than the overseas masters to whom their predecessors reported. But however 'progressive' and 'nationalist' their objective may have been, and regardless whether their outlook was communist, socialist, militaristic or capitalist in character, they were inevitably deeply constrained by one version or another of the European premises into which they had been either attracted inducted, all of which were far distant from those deployed by 'the masses' over whom the ruled. In other words *siasat* had been comprehensively replaced by a European form of political administration, albeit articulated by prosperous and more or less well-educated indigenes whose outlook for the most part differed radically from the greater part of the population over which they exercised their authority.

12 Post-colonial developments

Despite all this, many members of the new elite, and especially those with professional qualifications, began to feel increasingly uncomfortable with respect to their tendency to adoption of an uncritical commitment to all aspects of European understandings of rational modernity. In doing so they were not so much concerned about the scientific premises which underpinned their professional practice: rather what precipitated ever more concern was the

tendency of their Europeanised colleagues – and beyond them the European prototypes s whose premises they were seeking to ape – not only trashed religion as nothing more than irrational superstition, with the result, amongst other things, that they seemed to have no sense of moral compass from which to gain guidance in the course of organising their everyday lives. Hence they appeared to have no sense of honour, or of moral responsibility to their immediate kinsfolk, or indeed to the world at large.

One of the keenest articulators of this view was the Egyptian revivalist Sayyid Qutb (1906 - 66), in the aftermath of visit to the United States to in 1949 to study educational organization. The experience proved to be a turning point in his life, with the result that he became a severe critic of the West on his return. Although was initially an admirer of the United States, he suffer what can be described as a strong dose of culture shock during the course of his visit. He was scandalized by the sexual permissiveness and promiscuity of American society, the free use of alcohol, and free mingling of men and women in public. He went on to describe In Americans as being violent by nature and as having little respect for human life, their churches as entertainment centres and playgrounds for the sexes rather than places of worship. He was also astounded when an American female college student who told him that the sexual activity was not ethical, but merely biological matter, with the result that he concluded that. Americans had a primitive approach to sexuality.

Such criticisms were by no means novel: during the course of the Raj, Indians had been equally critical of what they perceived as the shameless behaviour of the Sahib's wives. Contemporary Islamic modernists have also been equally critical of the premises of governance with which the Europeans expected them to conform. Hence as Esposito puts it:

> Islamic modernism was primarily an intellectual movement. While it did not produce a unified movement or enduring organizations, its legacy was substantial in its influence on the Muslim community's development and its attitude toward the West: Islamic modernism reawakened Muslims to a sense of past power and glory; reinterpreted and produced a modern ideological interpretation of Islam; and demonstrated the compatibility of Islam with modern Western socio-political reform. (Esposito: 1999: 59-60)

From this perspective it is quite clear that the consequences of depredations of European imperialism were of an unprecedented kind. Hitherto the collapse of empires had invariably been followed by their restitution on the socio-cultural foundations of their predecessors, invariably under the aegis of a new dynasty, and often with significant boundary changes: as

has been the case in Dar ul-Islam for well over a millennium. However this time round the impact of European imperial expansion has turned out to be quite different. Although its impact was, and remains, a global phenomenon, its institutional shelf-life turned out to be remarkably short, at least in comparison with virtually all its predecessors. But at the same time it also proved to be a global political game-changer: besides eliminating all other imperial structures as it expanded, as the tide retreated it soon became clear that it was most unlikely to be replaced by a new series of imperial structures. Quite the contrary: in keeping of the theories of governance embedded in the premises of the enlightenment, it was replaced by an ever-growing multiplicity of sovereign nation-states. The age of Empires was over. To be sure the United States emerged as a global hegemon, partly as a result of its prosperity, but even more so as the US dollar became the as yet unchallenged global unit of exchange. Yet despite having constructed the largest and most sophisticated military capacity the world has ever seen, its efforts to develop an effective means global governance has failed, as it successively discovered in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Somalia. Hence for at least for the immediately foreseeable future, it is reasonable to assume that modern politics on a global scale will be articulated on a hitherto unprecedented set of premises: inter-*national* relations.

The roots of this game-change are now plain to see. It was not just that the premises of the European enlightenment have been successfully exported on a global scale during the course of the past two centuries; the impact of its premises on the indigenous elites throughout the globe was so far-reaching that when the tide went out in the aftermath of the Second World War, members of these elites invariably looked to modern forms governance – in other words the premises of the European enlightenment – as a means of introducing the jurisdiction for which they assumed responsibility into the modern world as a fully enlightened nation-state. Hence in sharp contrast to previous eras, in which recovery from dynastic collapse drew on the conceptual resources of Shari'a and Tariqa, and hence on premises of the *'ulema* on the one hand and *Pirs* one the other to revive and restore the damaged tissue of Dar ul-Islam, they played little or no part in restoring governance in the jurisdictions which emerged as the tide ran out beneath successive European empires. Instead their efforts were largely over-run by members of another kind of intellectual elite who had not been educated in *madrasa*, but rather in secular schools and Universities in which either French or English were the means of communication, and in which students were comprehensively introduced to all aspects of

the scientific and the philosophical premises of the European enlightenment – a world away from the traditional form of Islamic learning.

13 Reformation

Hence as the tide went out around the many localised administrative jurisdictions which the European colonists had seen fit to construct, the processes of Islamic reform and revivalism which developed in the post-colonial era were of an unprecedented kind. It was not just that members of the post-colonial elite who took over governance of the new-found nation states who took over the premises of their immediate predecessors, so did their numerous progressively organised – and often better educated – critics. As Esposito puts it:

> Most reformers distinguished between adopting Western ideas and technology and rejecting Western imperialism; indeed, they promoted the ideas of anti-colonialism and Muslim unity, autonomy, and independence. For these reasons, men like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Iqbal came to be remembered as fathers of Muslim nationalism.

> The period between the two world wars was dominated by two interrelated issues, nationalism and independence. Ironically, secular and Islamic reformers saw the West as being at one and the same time a positive and negative force. On the one hand, nationalism was a reaction to Western imperialism, to European colonial rule. On the other hand, it was also the product of a century of Westernizing reform.

> Many of those who led nationalist and independence movements owed their training to the West and were influenced by the liberal nationalist beliefs and ideals of the French Revolution (liberty, equality, fraternity) and, more specifically, modern Western political values and institutions such as democracy, constitutional government, parliamentary rule, individual rights, and nationalism. In contrast to the traditional Islamic ideal in which political loyalty and solidarity rest in a transnational Islamic community based upon common belief, modern nationalism represented the notion of national communities based not upon religion but upon common language, territory, ethnic ties, and history. (Esposito: 1999: 60).

In other words when it came to matters of governance reformers of almost all kinds casually abandoned the comprehensively pluralistic, as well as the endlessly flexible premises and practices of classical *Siasat* in favour of national entities constructed around commonalities of 'language, territory, ethnic ties, and history': in other words the empires which were such a salient feature pre-colonial Dar ul-Islam was cast aside in favour efforts to construct European-style nation-states on the foundations left behind by their colonial masters. But if the premises of *siasat* were radically reformed in this way, just what sort of impact would reformist revisionism have on the other two pillars of Dar ul-Islam: *Shari'at* and *Tariqat*? Hallaq begins to address the underlying issues as follows:

The political, legal, and cultural struggles of today's Muslims stem from a certain measure of dissonance between their moral and cultural aspirations, on the one hand, and the moral realities of a modern world, on the other – realities with which they must live but that were not of their own making.

The West (by which I mean here mainly Euro-America) lives somewhat more comfortably in a present that locates itself within a historical process that has been of its own creation. It lives in an age dictated by the terms of the Enlightenment, the industrial and technological revolutions, modern science, nationalism, capitalism, and the American-French constitutional tradition – all of which, and much more, have been organically and *internally* grown products.

The rest of the world has followed or, if not, has felt the pressure to do so. There is in effect no other history but that of Euro-America, not even pre-Enlightenment European history. Minor segments of earlier history may have been rescued or "retrieved" – e.g. Greek "democracy," Aristotle, the Magna Carta, and so forth – but these remain subservient, if not *instrumental*, to the imperatives of the modern historical narrative and to the progress of "Western civilization."

Africa and Asia, in most cases struggle in order to catch up, in the process not only foregoing the privilege of drawing on their own traditions and historical experiences that shaped who they were, but also letting themselves be drawn into devastating wars, poverty, disease and the destruction of their natural environment. Modernity, whose hegemonic discourse is determined by the institutions and intellectuals of the powerful modern West, has not offered a fair shake to two-thirds of the world's population, who have lost their history and, with it, their organic ways of existence. (Hallaq, 2013: 3-4)

But if Hallaq is right in thinking that in the post-colonial era Muslims have found themselves living in a global order which is no sense of their own making, and simultaneously lost contact with their own history, and with it their organic ways of existence, just what shape has the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism – whose vitality is currently becoming ever more salient day by day – actually taken, and on just what conceptual resources has Islamic revivalism relied?

Since all religious traditions are constantly revised, reinterpreted and hence diversified by their users, it is patently obvious to suggest that that the various form Islamic neo-fundamentalist revivalism which have emerged in the contemporary post-colonial era can readily be dismissed as 'non-Islamic' is patently absurd, even though Muslims who have managed to remain closer to the classical interpretations of Shari'a – and above all the premises of Tariqa – would readily agree with precisely that sentiment. How, then, can the two visions of Islam be distinguished from one another? In the light of Hallaq's vigorous analysis is plain to see: prior to its encounters with European empires, like all other religious traditions Dar ul-Islam, followed its own internal dynamics. Hence both its conceptual and organisational dimensions had been constantly reinterpreted and readjusted over the centuries, but always *on its own terms*. For convenience sake this dynamic and intrinsically pluralistic structure can usefully be identified as 'Classical Islam', whose remnants remain with us to this day.

By contrast what can best be described as the revivalist phenomenon neo-fundamentalist Islam is a specifically post-colonial phenomenon, which emerged as Muslims who had been comprehensively schooled in the premises of the European enlightenment by their colonial and post-colonial masters sought restore the damage which had been done to classical Islam during the colonial period by refurbishing, rationalising, and above all by *modernising* the creaking edifice which was their heritage. Unfortunately, however, the underlying contradiction between the two conceptual systems turned out to be so great that in the course of trying to bridge gulf, all manner of immensely valuable were swept away in the bathwater.

The logic behind these developments is not difficult to identify. Ashamed and embarrassed by the ease with which European empires had been able to overwhelm the greater part of Dar ul-Islam in the course of little more than a century, and having been convinced by their colonial teachers that their collapse was inevitable given their the jaded condition into which all of Islam's components had fallen, as members of newly educated elites began to emerge from their European-style schools and colleges they were invariably strongly committed both to reform and to modernisation of the social order of which they were a product; but at the same time they were for the most equally hostile to adopting of adopting the premises of their colonial masters hook, line and sinker, since that would simply reinforce their subservience. An alternative was consequently needed, two of which proved particularly popular: either to look to the antithesis of capitalist colonialism, in the form of socialism and/or communism, forms of governance to which their colonial masters were vigorously hostile; or to go one step further by looking way beyond the premises of the European enlightenment (of which Communism was also a product) in favour of revising, refurbishing and hence modernising the premises of Islam.

14   The emergence of neo-fundamentalism

Most of the elites who took over national governance in the immediate post-colonial period followed the first highly centralised option – regardless of their religious orientation. As they did so they aimed to set up set up homogenous nation-states which were not only secular in character, but subjected to a highly centralised form of 'scientific' governance. But although the edifices which they created were at least in principle congruent with European concepts of statehood, in practice they turned out to be deeply flawed. On the one hand they had little in the way of indigenous roots, and on the other the elites who took over displayed an alarming tendency to follow in the footsteps of the Soviet *nomenclatura*, such that Presidents routinely turned themselves into autocratic dictators.

Whilst that was certainly the case throughout the Islamic world, a strong counter-current to such developments had already begun to emerge prior to the collapse of Empire, whose authors sought to circumvent the 'failed states' of pre-colonial Dar ul-Islam no less than the alien premises of the European enlightenment, and instead to track back to the earliest days of Islam – as it was in the time

of the Prophet, as well as the *rashidun khalifat*, his four rightful successors. In doing so they took the view by tracing Islam back to is its unblemished foundations in this way they could circumvent all irrelevant accretions which had subsequent developed, such that they could be but put aside in favour of revised and refurbished vision of the premises of Islam which would have a place in the modern order which was equivalent to that of the currently hegemonic premises of the European enlightenment.

So long as we are prepared to acknowledge that that no form of governance is intrinsically perfect (prospect which enthusiastic supporters of the premises of the enlightenment still often do their best to deny) from the perspective of comparative governance the Islamic neo-fundamentalists were undoubtedly on the right track. However from both a conceptual and a historical perspective their efforts have turned out to be deeply flawed. Besides overlooking the sophisticated forms of governance which had been developed within Dar ul-Islam over the centuries, or in other words the conceptual sources of the kind in which the premises of the European enlightenment was rooted, they also drew heavily on precisely those developments – and most especially the conceptual upheavals which took place during the course of the European Reformation – as they set about constructing what they viewed as a suitably 'reformed' and 'modernised' vision of the premises of Islam. That they should have done so should come as no surprise.

Virtually all of the modernising reformists had little or no prior knowledge of classical Islam, and even if they did, their education had persuaded them that its current format its original premises had been obscured by centuries of irrelevant scholarly obscuration, as well as by superstitious mystical speculation that contemporary Islam premises and practices had long since passed their sell-by date. If so the only solution was to go back to the foundations of Islam, the better to comprehend its original, pristine and consequently its irrefutably fundamental premises – namely the directions set out in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Revivalism along these lines was in no means absent from classical Islam. In the aftermath of the chaos caused by the Mongol invasions Ibn Taymiyya had urged that in order to avoid future catastrophes of this kind, Dar ul-Islam should actively reinforce itself by returning to an austere and anti-pluralistic interpretation of its ancestral roots, all of which should be strictly obeyed. But whilst Dar ul-Islam reconstituted itself in its more developed from under the Timurids, Ibn Tamiyya's vision subsequently had a profound influence Ibn Wahhab (1703 – 1792), who likewise set about 'purifying' Islamic in the Arabian peninsula by eliminating religious innovation (*bid'ah*) and *shirk* (polytheism) from popular practice by use of threats of *takfir* (ostracisation), in a careful alliance with the local ruler, Muhammad bin-Saud – a relationship which has been maintained on a hereditary basis to this day.

But whilst Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Wahhab – as well as their equally influential Indian successor, Rashid Gangohi, who gave rise to the equally influential Deobandi movement in India during the latter part of the nineteenth century – were classical scholars with an intimate, if strictly conservative, knowledge of the both the Qur'an and Sunnah, the post-colonial revivalists who were inspired by their thinking still further during the course of the following century came out of quite a different drawer. Hence whilst Sayyid Qutub, the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, received a European education and was initially employed as a teacher, his equally influential counterpart, Abul ala Maududi, was a highly articulate English language journalist.

In founding the Jamaat-i-Islami Maududi's principle objective was to ensure that as Dar ul-Islam disengaged itself from the constraints of colonialism should avoid to achieve its ends not so much on the basis of mass organizing or a popular uprising, but rather on the basis of what he called "Islamization from above", in which society's leaders would be won over by means education and propaganda, and such that the right people – JI members of course – would be incrementally inserted into positions of power by legal means. But whilst the Jamaat rarely, if ever, gained a popular majority on this basis, Maududi's reformist proposals – including the abolition of interest-charged on loans, sexual separation and veiling of women, *hadd* penalties such as flogging and amputation for alcohol consumption, theft, fornication, and other crimes – proved highly influential in many post-colonial jurisdictions, all of which were seen as being necessary steps to towards the construction of a modern Islamic nation state.

However it was not long before a new generation of post-colonial neo-fundamentalists pressed yet further in this direction. Despite the efforts of both Qutb and Maududi's followers, the kinds of transformation that they had hoped to precipitate bore very little fruit: largely secular elites remained in power in most jurisdictions, and even when they inserted claims that all laws should be congruent with the premises of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet, the propositions were only followed half-heartedly. Worse still, the rich got steadily richer as the poor fell into ever greater poverty, whilst the elite routinely bolstered their position of political hegemony by building further links – both economic and military in character – initially with their former colonial powers, but subsequently with the ultimate global hegemon, the United States. In these circumstances the prospect of more egalitarian form of post-colonial Islamic governance faded further and further over the horizon.

15   Jihad and its consequences

 The Arabic term *jihad* is best understood as 'struggle'. Moreover in Islamic contexts it has two distinct dimensions: on the one hand it can be approached from the perspective of Siasat, from which it is understood as righteous and potentially violent struggles aimed at protecting and advancing the

institutions of Islam against the depredations of its political opponents. Meanwhile at the other end of the scale it can also be approached from the perspective of Tariqat, in which case the phenomenon is essentially metaphysical in character, as believers struggle overcome the internal constraints which impede their spiritual progress. This disjunction is clearly of ancient origin: if the all-conquering Saracens successfully waged *jihad* in the course of the early phase of conquest, it was in due course supplemented by – and in many senses overshadowed by – a spiritual, and hence an *internal* interpretation of *jihad,* which swiftly became a core feature of the *sufi* tradition, as the classical features of Islam crystallised in Khorasan, as the Buddhist converts added a powerful dimension of spiritual metaphysics to what had hitherto been a strictly Abrahamic construct.

But whilst the spiritualised concept of *jihad* consequently played a major role in bringing the classical Dar ul-Islam into its own, such that its militarised dimension was pressed onto the back burner, in no way did it disappear. Whenever the edifice of Dar ul-Islam found itself threatened – as, for example when the Christians of Western Europe launched a counter-*jihad* in which they managed to capture the Holy City of Jerusalem – a *jihad* was launched in an effort to restore the *status quo*. So it was that under the leadership under the leadership of Salah ud-Din the Crusaders were expelled from Jerusalem, and in due course indeed from all the colonies which they had managed to establish elsewhere in the Levant. In these circumstances it should come as no surprise that as Dar ul-Islam was over-ridden by European Empires, the prospect of engaging in armed *jihad* to throw out the intruders once again came to the forefront of its political agenda.

However this time round the balance of power had been reversed: it was not just the scale of the imperial achievements, together with their advanced military and economic capabilities, which enabled the European powers to gain a hegemonic position in the world order. They also owed their achievements to their success in eviscerating the indigenous socio-cultural foundations of the greater part of the non-European world during the course direct Imperial control. The consequences were disastrous: as 'modernised' non-European jurisdictions which emerged around the globe as the imperial tide retreated, they found they were in no position to challenge the novel forms of Euro-American hegemony which emerged in the aftermath of Imperial collapse. It is easy to see why. In a an ever more globalised world, the Euro-American jurisdiction still controlled – and went out their way to enforce – the premises of the global rule-book, in other words the premises of the European enlightenment. The consequences were far reaching: in these circumstances Euro-American could continue to play on their own home turf, whilst everyone else was required to play 'away'.

16   A world of modern Nation States

From an International Relations perspective, these developments can only be described disastrous. Although globalization has both shrunk and tightened the structure of the world order to an

unprecedented degree, effective global governance is no-where in sight. Although the era of imperial governance – of which Dar ul-Islam was one of the most extensive, most sophisticated, and the most sophisticated, and the most long-lived – has been swept away, it has now been replaced by a multiplicity of localised entities constructed (at least in principle) around the premises of the European enlightenment and the Treaty of Westphalia. But whilst the United Nations consequently brings together close to two hundred nation-states, all of nominally equal status, it is in no way a source of global governance: rather it is beset described as an international talking shop with no significant administrative powers. Nor are its members of equal status: the structure of institution was set out in the immediate aftermath of the second World War, prior to the impending collapse of European empires, with the result the four European powers (together China in the form of Taiwan) were allocated a right of veto in the Security Council: Dar ul-Islam did not get a look-in, since it was still largely subject to imperial control.

But whilst much has changed in empirical terms in the course of the past seventy years, its capacity to exercise global governance – which was never great – has shrunk still further; and although a multiplicity of nominally equal, as well nominally homogeneous nation-states have come into existence, they all suffer from similar problems. In the first place the member-states are far from equal in terms of both size and wealth; and although the mean level of wealth within each such jurisdiction has for the most part increased substantially, so has the inequality of its distribution. But if that was not enough, most of these jurisdictions have run into severe problems of governance as a result internal patterns of internal ethnic and religious diversity, either because the indigenous populations of nominally homogenous nation states were actually internally diverse, and/or because that condition of diversity was further reinforced by large-scale transjurisdictional migration in the post-colonial era.

No-where did these development causes greater problems than in the sphere of Dar ul-Islam. However that was in no way the result of inadequacies in the implementation of governance in the classical period, during which highly effective strategies were developed to cope with cultural and religious plurality, to sustain infrastructural facilities for the benefit of the public at large, including a highly effective means of dispute settlements, a means of ensuring that financial transactions were conducted on an equitable basis, and last but not least to provide extensive charitable support for the indigent. Whilst this is in no to suggest that form of governance developed under the premises of classical Dar ul-Islam was the acme of perfection (which in my view is an intrinsically unachievable goal), there are nevertheless excellent grounds for suggesting that that Islamic governance dealt much more effectively with the ever more alarming contradictions which have begun to emerge in the midst of our current condition of modernity.

Moreover in a further paradox, those contradictions are nowhere more salient, or more alarming, in and around what currently remains of Dar ul-Islam. But if so, nothing could be more misleading than to draw the conclusion that such outcomes are no more than a manifestation of long-standing systemic faults in its classical make-up. Quite the contrary: they are much better understood as the result of the dynamics of the disastrous encounter between the premises of Dar ul-Islam and those the European enlightenment during the final period of global expansion, during the course of which they key premises of the classical structure was successfully eviscerated from minds of a new, educated, and hence 'enlightened' elite. Moreover by the time the process of comprehensive disillusionment began to set in, and along with that an effort to restore and revive the past glories of Islam, the revivalists had been so effectively been indoctrinated by the critical European judgements of its contemporary features that they came to the view that they had no alternative but to start over, and hence to re-assess the contents of Qur'an and the Sunna on their own rationalistic – and hence intrinsically 'enlightened' – terms. In other words individualistically oriented, deterministic, pluralistic and potentially violent premises of Euro-American origin were surreptitiously and unconsciously smuggled into what remained of Dar ul-Islam through the back door.

From that perspective, movements ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood, the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and most recently of all the so-called 'Islamic state' in Syria and Iraq are all thoroughly *modern* movements, legitimated in each case by a neo-fundamentalist reading of carefully selected excerpts drawn from the Qur'an; and if the initial turn towards neo-fundamentalism was initially precipitated by disillusion with Euro-American disdain, it was strongly fortified by a series of disastrous foreign policy initiatives, led by the United States and faithfully supported by Britain. Let us not forget that that Osama bin-laden was initially 'radicalised' when he set off to support the Afghan *mujahedeen* after the Soviet invasion of their homeland, and further outraged when the Saudi government refused to accept his military support when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in favour of American forces, which in due course led to retribution by the attack on the twin towers on 9/11. The result of all this can only be regarded as a blood feud, identified by President Bush as a crusade, leading to vast, expensive, an ongoing global war on terror. But any hope that this exercise might serve to eliminate *jihad* has proved to be nugatory. As 'boots on the ground' proved to be as ineffective as it embarrassing, the United States began to rely on drones and other forms of aerial bombardment, more and more young Muslims volunteered to join the *jihad*; as a result chaos now reigns all the way from Algeria to Afghanistan.

But whilst Euro-Americans' fears of yet another incident on the scale of 9/11 has not yet occurred, in the form of a self-appointed role as global policeman, the United States continued to wage its global war on terror, driven on by its perceived need to prop up increasingly discredited, but US-friendly Muslim dictators – thereby pouring yet more petrol on the fire. But in absence of any form of

appropriate *Siasat*, together with the comprehensive marginalisation of classical resources of both *Shariat* and *Tariqat*, chaos has spread like wildfire across the greater part of Dar ul-Islam. Modelled on the behaviour of the early Saracens, the simplistic premises of Islamic neo-fundamentalism has proved to be immensely attractive to deracinated young Muslims, no less in the contemporary post-colonial diaspora than in the long established territories over which Dar ul-Islam exercised jurisdiction, and hence governance, in pre-colonial times.

Hence as neo-fundamentalist ideologies developed apace during the course of the past during the last few decades, effortless crossing all manner of post-colonial (and hence artificial) national boundaries thanks to arrival of the global internet. Moreover as the impact of *Siasat*, *Shariat* and *Tariqat* sources governance declined even more rapidly in the post-colonial order, neo-fundamentalistic activists in pursuit of 'Pure Islam' opened up ever more internal tribal, ethnic, sectarian and religious disjunctions across the length and breadth of steadily diminishing force of Dar ul-Islam. As we currently stand in the early decades of the twenty-first centuries, we appear to stand on the edge of an even greater bloodbath than that which was precipitated by the Mongol invasions – and with no obvious way out.

It is not just that at least in political terms, the simplistic premises of neo-fundamentalism have by now largely overwhelmed the premises in of *Siasat*, *Shariat* and *Tariqat* in the greater part of what remains of Dar ul-Islam, much to the alarm of the what has recently come to be described as 'The International Community', and especially its primary recruiting sergeant, the United States, declared a global War on Terror, subtitled by President Bush as a Crusade, in the aftermath of 9/11. It is proving to be a long war, with no obvious end in sight. Moreover as the offspring *Firangi* crusaders who invaded the Levant the best part of a millennium ago have begun to set about waging what their opponents view as the nth Crusade, the response with which they currently find themselves confronted is of a strictly post-colonial kind. If the neo-fundamentalists are seeking the 'enforce Shari'a Law' and to restore the Caliphate, their strategies owe little or nothing to the premises of classical Dar ul-Islam. On the contrary, insofar as the neo-fundamentalists read the Shari'a as if it was Austinian legal code, and also model their new found Islamic nation-state around the premises which were initially established in the treaty of Westphalia, their efforts to restore Dar ul-Islam are intrinsically *modernistic* in character.

If so, there are good reasons to suggest that just as in the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States, when the two sides' socio-political policies were rooted in differing interpretations of the premises of the European enlightenment, the whole game is currently being replayed in a new crusade, the so-called 'war on terror', in which both sides strongly committed to the righteousness of their cause, and hence that civilization as each of them see it is at risk – even if there is a strong sense in which at an ideological level they are rapidly becoming mirrors of one another. Nevertheless there

is every likelihood that as the battle continues for much longer, the physical and metaphysical resources of Euro-America run so deep, given that they have centuries of continuous development behind them, whist the even more ancient premises of Dar ul-Islam have largely been swept away in the midst of post-colonial developments, as international violence becomes steadily more intense, the former is likely to overwhelm the latter. Nevertheless any such military victory is almost certain to be Pyric in character. No matter how severely those targeted in the long war may eventually be over-run by the ever expanding forces of anti-terrorism, the prospect of a billion Muslims eagerly adopting the premises of the European enlightenment is remote – no matter how difficult they may find it to reconstruct the three-fold arms of classical Dar ul-Islam in the post-colonial era.

As yet, however, any sympathy which Euro-Americans may once have had for liberated post-colonial subjects as by virtually disappeared. Instead they have come to fear that as their former colonial subjects have become agents in their own cause – and especially under the flag of Islam – are doing so in such a way as to challenge they very foundations contemporary European civilisation: rationality, secularism, freedom and democracy. But are those premises really so perfectly enlightened as they when they cannot cope with those who premises differ, especially when the socio-cultural heritage on which they rely is in fact a great deal more ancient than theirs? And was it the case that the Imperial confiscations which achieved during the nineteenth century evidence of Euro-Americas civilizational superiority thereby established for all time?

17 Conclusion

Close to two decades ago, I explored precisely these issues in an essay entitled *Islam and the Construction of Europe* (Ballard 1996), in which I observed that:

> Europe has had the Islamic world as its neighbour for more than a millennium, but it has never felt able either to acknowledge it's alter as an equal, or to take its cultural or religious traditions seriously. Having spent more than a millennium reading Islam through the distorting prism of their own deeply entrenched assumptions, more information, however accurate, is unlikely to make much difference to conventional European judgments.

> Is there any solution? I believe there is, although by a route that is so deeply uncomfortable that the very need to embark on it is likely to be tenaciously resisted. The logic of the analysis presented here is that the most urgent priority is not for Europe to understand its alters better, but rather itself and its own history – for it is within Europe's own long-standing structures of self-definition that pluralism in general, and the Islamic presence in particular, have been rendered into nightmares. If so, it is Europe itself which stands in urgent need of therapy. But as yet the patient is still in denial, and as any psychotherapist would confirm, those who refuse to acknowledge the seriousness of their self-generated plight find it far easier to engage in a process of transference. Rather than confronting the illusory character of their own mental constructions, they prefer to ascribe the very behaviour which they refuse to acknowledge in themselves onto those whom they believe are harassing them.

Can Europe afford to stay in denial? Half a century has passed since six million souls were consumed in an earlier effort to extirpate such fantasies, but despite all the consequent guilt and shame Europe has managed to find itself another collective alter, about whose very presence some all too familiar arguments are now developing. Yet despite these disturbing parallels, any future confrontation may well have a far greater impact on Europe's comfortable majority than did the last. Europe's Muslims have already begun to resist denigration and exclusion far more actively than did their predecessors; and Europe's Muslim population currently roughly similar in scale to that of pre-holocaust Jewry, their global presence is very much larger. If conflict should erupt across that disjunction – which God forbid! – casualties would not be restricted to one side. Unwelcome and comfortable though the prospect of therapy may be – for it will necessarily entail a root and branch scrutiny of Europe's entire conceptual and cultural heritage – only one diagnostic conclusion is available: if Europeans choose to maintain their long-standing condition of denial, it is at their own peril. (Ballard 1996).

In no way do I wish to claim any kind of prescience with a respect to a contradiction which has a thousand years of history behind it. All I would observe is that from 9/11 right through to Charlie Hebdo, the Euro-American death-toll has risen steadily – although we should never forget that the level of death and destruction precipitated elsewhere in the course of the War on terror has proved to be infinitely greater. However both sense and sensibility has been entirely absent in the face of these developments; on the contrary blind rage has begun to take over; could it really be the case that Euro-America is about to launch yet another Holocaust to prevent European Civilization from being overwhelmed by the barbarians?

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